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Highlights 
 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 regime improves National DNA Database 
performance 
 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 strengthens genetic privacy protection of individuals 
Implementation challenges of PoFA leads to unlawful forensic DNA data retention/non-
retention 
 
Abstract 
In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights, in S and Marper v the United Kingdom, ruled that a 
retention regime that permits the indefinite retention of DNA records of both convicted and non-
convicted (“innocent”) individuals is disproportionate. The court noted that there was inadequate 
evidence to justify the retention of DNA records of the innocent. Since the Marper ruling, the laws 
governing the taking, use, and retention of forensic DNA in England and Wales have changed with the 
enactment of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). This Act, put briefly, permits the indefinite 
retention of DNA profiles of most convicted individuals and temporal retention for some first-time 
convicted minors and innocent individuals on the National DNA Database (NDNAD). The PoFA 
regime was implemented in October 2013. This paper examines ten post-implementation reports of the 
NDNAD Strategy Board (3), the NDNAD Ethics Group (3) and the Office of the Biometrics 
Commissioner (OBC) (4). Overall, the reports highlight a considerable improvement in the performance 
of the database, with a current match rate of 63.3%. Further, the new regime has strengthened the genetic 
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privacy protection of UK citizens. The OBC reports detail implementation challenges ranging from 
technical, legal and procedural issues to sufficient understanding of the requirements of PoFA by police 
forces. Risks highlighted in these reports include the deletion of some “retainable” profiles, which could 
potentially lead to future crimes going undetected. A further risk is the illegal retention of some profiles 
from innocent individuals, which may lead to privacy issues and legal challenges. In conclusion, the 
PoFA regime appears to be working well, however, critical research is still needed to evaluate its overall 
efficacy compared to other retention regimes. 
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1 Introduction 
The United Kingdom National DNA Database (NDNAD) was established in April 1995. It is the oldest 
national forensic DNA database in the world and the largest measured by the proportion of citizens on 
the database (over 8.2%). It holds DNA data from all police forces in England and Wales as well as 
data from: the Northern Ireland DNA Database (NIDNAD); the Scottish DNA Database (SDNAD); 
and DNA profiles from the Crown Dependencies (Isle of Man, the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Bailiwick 
of Guernsey). As at September 2017, the NDNAD held 6,112,274 subject reference profiles (of which 
5,317,752 are known individuals due to duplication) and 575,923 crime scene DNA profiles.[1] The 
primary purpose of the database is to identify unknown offenders as well as serial offenders by linking 
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different crimes. Another potential value of the database is the possibility of analysing crime patterns,[2] 
providing intelligence that can assist law enforcement agencies in prioritising resources. Although less 
than 1% of recorded crime is detected using the NDNAD, the detection rate of crimes that involve DNA 
matches on the database is higher than crimes without DNA evidence.[2,3] 
The criminal justice value of retained DNA profiles can be illustrated by cases such as those of Keith 
Samuels[4–6] and that of Joseph Kappen.[7] Keith Samuels was a resident of Northampton who raped 7 
different women from 1984 to 1990. He was apprehended in a cheque fraud case in 1998 when his DNA 
was then sampled by the police. On loading his profile to the NDNAD, a match was found between his 
reference sample and the crime scene profiles from the rapes stored on the database. This led to his 
subsequent conviction and nine life sentences in 1999.  
In the triple rape and murder case of Joseph Kappen, forensic investigators utilised a then innovative 
sub-programme of the database called familial searching. This involves searching the database for 
closely matched profiles to identify potential relatives.[8] The crimes took place in 1973 and the cold 
case was re-investigated in 2000. Forensic scientists used the Low Template DNA technique[9] to 
generate DNA profiles from crime scene samples. A search of the database returned zero hits after 
which a familial search was launched. The stored DNA profile of Paul Kappen, a car thief, was found 
to share half of the offender’s profile. Further investigation led to his deceased father Joseph Kappen 
whose identity as the offender was confirmed following DNA analysis of samples recovered from the 
teeth and femur of his exhumed body.  
The retention regimes for DNA data from England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland are 
independent of each other though they share similarities and currently, the law in England, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland is the same. Different legislative regimes governing DNA data retention have been 
implemented for the England and Wales NDNAD since 1995. A summary of the different legislative 
regimes enacted or proposed for the retention of forensic DNA profiles is presented in Table 1. The first 
governing statute, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA),[10] amended the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) to enable the databasing of DNA profiles. The CJPOA permitted 
DNA records (both DNA samples and derived forensic DNA profiles) of all individuals convicted of a 
recordable offence to be retained indefinitely. The Act generally required DNA records of those who 
had never been convicted of a criminal offence, to be considered “innocent”, and thus deleted after the 
conclusion of an investigation or any proceedings. All data retained on the database were subject to 
speculative searching against other profiles.  
The implementation of the CJPOA regime encountered procedural challenges such as repeated 
sampling of offenders and suspects, and potential risks to public security due to legal technicalities.[3] 
In the murder case of R v Weir,[11] for example, a conviction was overturned by the Court of Appeal due 
to the unlawful retention of the subject’s DNA profile, which had initially led to the identification of 
the offender. This resulted in public security concerns and led to the amendment of the law by the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (CJPA) and subsequently, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA). 
This second retention regime permitted the indefinite retention of DNA records of convicted 
individuals, those acquitted of an offence or whose proceedings against them had been discontinued, 
and those charged or arrested for a recordable offence. The implementation of the second regime was 
perceived as a simple system to administer,[12] potentially minimising repeated sampling and allowing 
the police to gather and retain data of the “active criminal population”. Additionally, an expanded 
database was perceived to have a deterrent effect, albeit there did not exist evidence to support this 
potential benefit.[2] Critics of this second regime noted the inversion of the presumption of innocence 
and the risk of creating a “suspect society”.[13,14] Moreover, there was no justification provided for the 
retention of data from innocent individuals,[15] that is whether it contributed to the performance of the 
database and aided the detection of crime. 
In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in S and Marper v the United Kingdom[16] ruled 
that this represented a “blanket” and “indiscriminate” retention regime which did not strike a fair 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
4 
 
balance between an individual’s right to privacy and the public interest. This case involved “S” (a 
juvenile) and Mr Marper, who were separately charged in 2001 with attempted robbery and sexual 
assault respectively. S was acquitted and Mr Marper’s case was discontinued, but their DNA and 
fingerprint records were retained. A request for the deletion/destruction of their biometric records was 
declined and subsequent appeals to the English Courts were unsuccessful. At the EtCHR, the judges 
unanimously decided that the expansive regime infringed upon Article 8 rights to privacy, noting the 
inadequate justification for the retention of “innocent” samples and profiles (the “Marper gap”). This 
ruling led to the development of new retention rules set out in the Crime and Security Act 2010 (CSA)[17] 
(see Table 1) which were informed by consultations and research carried out by the Jill Dando Institute 
of Crime Science. This research attempted to determine the risk of re-arrest among unconvicted 
individuals (~52% in 6 years),[18] yet it was heavily criticised, primarily because the data relied upon 
was unclear.[15] Due to a change in government, the CSA regime was never brought into force. Instead, 
the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) was developed by the subsequent coalition government 
to govern DNA and fingerprint data retention in England and Wales.[19] 
The PoFA rules in summary include: the destruction of DNA samples after profiling or within 6 months 
of collection; indefinite retention of convicted individuals’ DNA profiles; and deletion of profiles from 
innocent individuals after the conclusion of an investigation or any proceedings.[20] The exceptions to 
these general rules include: temporal profile retention periods for some first time convicted minors; 
those charged or arrested for a qualifying (serious) offence; those issued with a penalty notice for 
disorder; or on national security grounds. Since the implementation of PoFA in October 2013, over 1.7 
million forensic DNA profiles from “innocent” individuals have been deleted and over 7.7 million DNA 
samples have been destroyed post-DNA profiling.[21] Critical reviews of the PoFA regime highlight the 
potential incommensurate treatment of public and private interests and the continuing lack of “weighty 
reasons” for the retention of data from innocent individuals.[15,22,23]   
Two independent statutory bodies have specific oversight functions for the UK National DNA 
Database: the NDNAD Strategy Board (“Strategy Board”) (now the National DNA and Fingerprint 
Databases Strategy Board) and the Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material 
(Biometrics Commissioner).[24,25] The statutory role of the Strategy Board is provided in section 24 of 
PoFA, being required by law to provide guidance on the retention and destruction of DNA profiles, 
governance rules for the database, and produce an annual report about the exercise of its functions.[20] 
The statutory functions of the Biometrics Commissioner are set out under section 20 and 21 of PoFA. 
The Commissioner’s role is to keep under review the retention and use of DNA and fingerprints under 
the PoFA retention regime. Further, the Commissioner is also required by law to provide an annual 
report. Another independent advisory non-departmental public body with an oversight role is the 
NDNAD Ethics Group (NEG) (now changed to the Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group 
(BFEG)).[26,27] The NEG operates on a non-statutory basis and its vision is to ensure that the operation 
of the NDNAD is ethical. The NEG also produces an annual report about its work and 
recommendations. This paper thus reviews these annual reports of the NDNAD Strategy Board, the 
NDNAD Ethics Group and the Office of the Biometrics Commissioner (OBC) published since the 
implementation of PoFA. The purpose of the review is to identify the potential benefits, challenges or 
gaps, risks, and emerging issues associated with the new DNA data retention regime under PoFA, which 
has not yet been subjected to critical review.[12,25,28]  
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2 Methodology 
A total of ten annual reports of the three independent bodies with specific oversight functions for the 
UK National DNA Database were analysed for recurrent themes on the benefits and best practice, 
challenges, risks, and emerging issues associated with the implementation of PoFA. The ten reports 
were published after implementation of PoFA (October 2013). The review includes three annual reports 
of the Strategy Board (2013/14, 2014/15 and 2015/16), three annual reports of the NEG (2014, 2015 
and 2016) and three annual reports (2014, 2015 and 2016) and a supplementary report of the Biometrics 
Commissioner (Table 2). The general principles of thematic synthesis of literature and qualitative data 
was used to generate the key themes in the review.[29–32] The iterative process involved the coding of 
text, sorting of relevant codes into key themes, comparing the generated themes to the original report 
and then between the reports for similarities and differences.  
3 Results 
The key themes identified from the ten reports are summarised in Table 3 below. The thematic synthesis 
of the reports identified a total of twenty-one key themes in relation to forensic DNA. Comparatively, 
the reports of the Biometrics Commissioner produced more themes (n=20) than the other independent 
bodies (Strategy Board (n=5), NEG (n=7)). This is explained by the comprehensive and detailed nature 
of the Commissioner’s reports, as well as the dedicated focus upon PoFA (as this Act gave rise to the 
statutory duties of the OBC) and the retention, use, international sharing and destruction of DNA 
profiles and fingerprints, and overall compliance with the PoFA. The Strategy Board and NEG reports 
also cover other issues unrelated to PoFA and thus did not contribute so many of the key themes.  
3.1 Benefits of PoFA implementation 
The implementation of the PoFA regime has resulted in several benefits noted in the reviewed reports. 
The new regime is reported to have strengthened the level of protection of the privacy interests of 
innocent individuals.[12,24–26,28,33–36] For example, in cases where the retention of DNA profiles of 
unconvicted individuals is deemed necessary, the PoFA procedures require corroboration of the 
suspicious involvement of the individual.[35] Further, the process has reinforced the requirement to 
provide suspected individuals with detailed information on the grounds for the retention of their data 
and their right to make representations.[35] Most of the reports indicate a wide acceptance of the PoFA 
regime as a more proportionate system.[12,24–26,28,33–36] The implementation of the new regime has 
increased awareness of ethical and legal considerations, including privacy rights, proportionality and 
necessity. The new system has established a critical monitoring and assessment of legal compliance 
with PoFA when retaining DNA profiles, in order to fulfil obligations upon the State to respect human 
rights (Human Rights Act 1998), as demanded by Marper. Interestingly, some of the reports 
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recommend the need to apply the PoFA rules to other new biometric technologies.[12,26,28] The 2015 
annual report of the Ethics Group specifically recommends that “the retention times directed in the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 for the retention of DNA samples and fingerprints should also be 
applied to the retention of custody images.”[26] Whilst the retention of custody images is considered by 
some as less intrusive than DNA, the Ethics Group believe their retention raises significant privacy 
concerns. Hence, the need to apply the PoFA rules to custody images.[26]  
Match rate is an output metric used to assess the performance of the NDNAD. It measures the chance 
that a crime scene profile loaded on the NDNAD matches a subject profile.[24] Since its establishment 
in 1995, the NDNAD has provided the highest match rates (61.9% in 2013-14,[33] 63.2% in 2014-15,[34] 
and 63.3% in 2015-16[24]) with the introduction of the PoFA regime. The current match rate is also 
reported to be one of the highest across DNA databases in Europe. The 2014 NEG report notes that “the 
initial impression is that the removal of large numbers of “unconvicted” profiles has not significantly 
affected the effectiveness of the database, although it is too early to draw firm conclusions.”[35] Most of 
the reports emphasise that the new system seems to have had a positive impact on the match output of 
the database.[12,24,25,28,33–35]  
Another potential benefit of the PoFA system, as suggested in the 2014 OBC report, is that it has 
significantly decreased costs, and resources required for storing millions of samples indefinitely under 
previous regimes.[12] The new system has also led to the introduction of PoFA compliance checks by 
the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) and the Biometrics Commissioner for accredited 
Forensic Science Providers (FSPs) and police forces, respectively.[12,28] This has mandated the 
introduction of adequate processes by FSPs and police forces to demonstrate compliance with the new 
regime. Although compliance checks have not been completed for all police forces, the Office of the 
Biometrics Commissioner asserts that the bulk of samples/data that need to be retained or destroyed 
have indeed been retained or destroyed.[12,25,28]  
Finally, another practical value of the new system is the opportunity for case reviews.[12,28] Best practice 
has been identified when Biometrics Retention Units (BRU) are established within police forces.[28] A 
BRU can assess cases and identify those that may benefit from extended biometric data retention. This 
has led to the identification of shortcomings in some cases. For example, the BRU of the Metropolitan 
Police Service (MPS) identified a sexual assault case with a suspect for whom a No Further Action 
(NFA) entry had been made, where they should have been charged (they were subsequently 
convicted).[12] Other cases where no biometric data were taken have also been identified and the data of 
the individuals involved have now been obtained and added to the NDNAD.  
3.2 Challenges of the PoFA implementation 
3.2.1 Police National Computer (PNC) limitations 
The automatic deletion of biometric records on the NDNAD is driven by the Police National Computer, 
which contains records of all arrestees. One of critical challenge with the implementation of PoFA thus 
arises from limitations with the configuration of the PNC programme.[12,25,28] The 2014 and 2015 
reports[12,28] of the Biometrics Commissioner extensively detail the technical and procedural challenges 
encountered with the PNC.  
Firstly, the PNC programme requires manual entries to be made to drive the “automatic” deletion of 
data on the NDNAD.[12,28] Although the programme could be improved to support the new system, its 
high-cost and resource implications have compelled the police to settle for the current 
“compromise”.[12,28] This has led to some erroneous retention of biometric data.[12,28] The guidance 
provided requires forces to confirm the legality of every match generated before progressing an 
investigation.[12,28] Secondly, the PNC is not compatible with the PoFA concept “the conclusion of the 
investigation of an offence” which triggers the automatic deletion of data from innocent 
individuals.[12,28] Another compromise has been found by substituting with the similar concept of the 
“NFA” entry made on the PNC.[12,28] For protracted investigations where an individual is “NFA-ed” but 
extended retention is deemed necessary, the current guidance requires the Biometrics Commissioner to 
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provide discretionary retention advice.[28] Thirdly, the efficiency of the PNC is determined by the 
timeliness and accuracy of entries made by forces. Delays in updating the PNC or erroneous entries due 
to misunderstanding of retention markers have resulted in unlawful retention or loss of data in some 
instances.[12,25,28]  
3.2.2 Non-engagement of police forces with PoFA 
Another critical challenge with the implementation of the PoFA system is poor engagement by police 
forces. The reports of the Biometrics Commissioner emphasise the limited applications made by police 
forces (23 out of 43 forces in 2015/16) in the case of individuals arrested for a serious offence (section 
63G of PACE).[12,25,28] Although the expected annual applications were estimated at ~1000 per year, 
there was a total of 386 applications from October 2013 to December 2016 (91 in 2013/14, 118 in 
2014/15 and 177 in 2015/16), with over 75% (290) of applications by the MPS alone.[25,28] Further, there 
were only 6 applications made for those charged with qualifying offences (Section 63F (7) of PACE) – 
all made by the MPS.[25,28] The reasons for non-engagement include: financial and resource demands; 
dissatisfaction among some forces about the transfer of risk from legislators; the perception that 
individuals can be sampled in future offences when they become suspects; and difficulties in identifying 
cases or understanding the circumstances in which retention is required.[25,28] 
3.2.3 Limited data on case resolution rate 
Most reports noted the limited data to adequately demonstrate the effectiveness of the new retention 
regime.[12,24,25,28,33–35] The 2014 NEG report[35] proposed methods to address this deficit, including the 
collection of data on the size of each retention category, the match rate of the database before and after 
PoFA implementation, and the match rate for each retention criteria. The report indicates that there has 
been some progress made in this respect although a post-legislative scrutiny of the PoFA system is yet 
to be carried out, and the Biometrics Commissioner’s reports have emphasised that such a review should 
be informed by rigorous research into the efficacy of the new retention regime.[12,28] 
The reports of the Strategy Board include data on the output of the database (i.e. the annual match rate) 
and “positive match outcomes” including charges/summons, caution/warnings, issuance of a penalty 
notice for disorder (PND) and community resolution (41.6% in 2014/15; 50.4% in 2015/16).[24,34] 
Further statistics are reported in the third report of the Biometrics Commissioner which shows that DNA 
is linked to case outcome in only 0.3% of all recorded crime (0.9% for theft of vehicles, 1.4% for 
domestic burglaries, 0.6% for rapes and 8.4% for homicides).[25] There is still no information, however, 
on how DNA contributes to case resolution.[25] In this regard, the Ethics Group have recommended the 
collection of data on NDNAD match conviction rates in sexual assault cases.[26,36] One difficulty in 
determining these rates is that the DNA match is normally just one element in a larger body of evidence 
or, because of the different circumstances of each case, it cannot be easily determined if the DNA 
evidence alone “led” to a conviction.[25,35] Moreover, offenders may have been identified by other means 
and the DNA match may have only confirmed identity.[25] The 2015 NEG report indicates preliminary 
research has been initiated to address this issue.[26]  
3.2.4 Database contamination and error rates 
The Ethics Group notes that some “contaminated data” may be retained on the NDNAD, a situation 
which undermines principles of data protection and the goal of ensuring proportionality.[35] This 
problem is partly due to the non-routine checking of the Police Elimination Databases (PED). An 
ongoing project to establish a Centralised Elimination Database (CED) that will be subject to weekly 
searching is proposed to address this issue.[24,26,34,36] Another problem is the limited information on the 
scale of errors related to the use of DNA.[25,35]  Information on the scale of errors is important because 
the rate of subject sampling error has currently been found to be “unacceptably high”.[25] Issues related 
to DNA sampling errors and database contamination are currently under investigation.[24–26]  
3.2.5 Inadequate enforcement of PoFA rules for CTDNAD 
The Counter-terrorism DNA Database is a standalone database that stores DNA profiles related to 
counter-terrorism policing. Prior to the third report of the Biometrics Commissioner, the holdings of 
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the CTDNAD was unknown.[25] Available data now indicates the CTDNAD holds 608 DNA profiles 
of which 11% (65) are from unconvicted individuals.[25] There has been a “governance deficit” in the 
operation of the CTDNAD; resulting from inadequate enforcement of the PoFA regime.[12,26,28,35,37] 
Hence, a significant data due for deletion may still be retained.[37] The difficulties with the operation of 
the CTDNAD are compounded by expiry problems due to procedural delays in sample transfer from 
ports (entry points to the country) to the Secure Operations – Forensic Services (formerly known as 
Counter Terrorism Forensic Services – the unit that operates the CTDNAD).[37] Other issues include 
delays in referral of cases to the Joint Forensic Intelligence Team (the team that makes National Security 
Determination (NSD) Assessments) and provision of summary assessments and incorrect estimation of 
expiry dates due to incompatible IT-systems.[37] Steps are being taken to minimise the risks associated 
with these issues and since July 2016 no data has been lost.[25,37] Finally, the Biometrics Commissioner 
notes the “(…) difficulty of obtaining reliable statistical information about the biometric material on 
the CT databases [including the CTDNAD] that is subject to the requirements of PoFA”.[37] This means 
that some material that requires an NSD application may have been overlooked or data that requires 
deletion may have been retained.[37]  
3.2.6 Limited statutory guidance on discretionary retention 
Statutory guidance on retention decisions under section 63G of PACE is considered to be limited.[12,28] 
Further, there is no indication of the extent of disclosure when informing unconvicted individuals on 
the grounds for data retention.[12,25,28] A consultation to develop core principles and guidelines was 
carried out in May 2013.[38] Detailed processes consistent with the guidance of the NDNAD Strategy 
Board have now been developed.[12,25,28] This considers factors such as the seriousness of the offence, 
characteristics of the individual, value, proportionality and necessity of retention, and whether the 
individual has been informed of the retention of data and their right to make representations.[12,25,28]  
Another issue with discretionary retention is that there is no legal definition or guidelines for the section 
63E of PACE concept “the conclusion of the investigation of the offence”.[12,25,28] This makes it difficult 
to determine when an application for extended retention is necessary.[12,28] The substituted procedure of 
the NFA entry made on the PNC for arrestees is not without problems.[28] The discretionary retention 
procedure is perceived to be complicated and a “bright-line rule” may be preferable because it is easier 
and cheaper to implement.[28] A bright-line rule is when, for example, samples or data of those charged 
with a qualifying offence are automatically subjected to three years’ retention. It is also suggested that 
the abolition of discretionary retention under section 63G and 63F(7) of PACE may not significantly 
endanger public security or decrease the efficiency of the NDNAD.[28]  
Other guidance gaps with discretionary retention are resampling of individuals after data deletion and 
the PoFA requirement for a causal relationship between sampling arrest and any conviction.[12,33,34] For 
the former, initial guidance policy permitted resampling by consent when an investigation is reopened. 
Currently, section 144 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (ASBCPA) permits 
resampling without consent. For the causal relationship requirement, new section 145 of ASBCPA now 
provides that there is no need for a sampling arrest to lead to charge or conviction before retention, 
allowing a sample taken in one offence to be used for another offence. 
3.2.7 Misapplication of CPIA exception 
The Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996 (CPIA) exception permits extended retention of 
DNA samples for prosecution disclosure purposes.[12,25,28] Changes under PoFA considered the CPIA 
exception for DNA profiles for all offences and DNA samples of individuals involved in a serious 
offence. A wider application of the CPIA exception for samples was introduced by section 146 of the 
ASBCPA. This applies to only the relevant offence for which the sample was taken. It is noted that 
oversight of the CPIA exception is inadequate, and the rule may be misapplied by some forces due to 
uncertainty of the circumstances requiring its application.[12,25,28] A new system introduced in January 
2016 requires all “CPIA samples” to be subjected to quarterly review by police forces.[25] 
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3.2.8 Inadequate rules for volunteer sampling and samples 
Another challenge with the implementation of PoFA is the lack of adequate rules for volunteer or 
elimination samples.[12,26,28,35] This oversight has resulted in prolonged retention of volunteer DNA 
samples since they are subjected to indefinite retention – a situation that may discourage individuals 
from donating samples for use in criminal investigations.[28] The third report of the Biometrics 
Commissioner indicates this issue has been resolved and volunteer samples are now subjected to PoFA 
rules (since January 2016).[25] A second issue with volunteer sampling is the lack of information 
provided to volunteers on consent forms regarding the grounds for retention of their DNA.[28] The Ethics 
Group “still remains concerned that the consent forms used do not show that the rights of individuals 
concerned are sufficiently protected”.[35] This concern was raised in the first NEG report published on 
July 21, 2008, prior to the implementation of PoFA. An appropriate consent form was finalised by 
relevant stakeholders in 2015 and this was introduced in January 2016.[25,26,28,36] 
3.3 Risks and emerging issues 
3.3.1 Public security risk due to non-retention of data 
The complexities of discretionary retention have led to, and will continue to lead to, the potential 
deletion of some DNA profiles that need to be retained.[12,25,28] This problem may negatively impact 
upon the efficient detection or prevention of crime in the UK. Another matter of concern is legal, 
technical and resource issues related to data retention of individuals convicted of serious offences 
outside the UK. The biometric records (including DNA) of thousands of individuals who have 
convictions from another country have not been subjected to indefinite retention (as permitted by law) 
and hence data have been deleted or will be deleted from the database, exposing the public to potential 
security risks.[12] Another difficulty is that, though permitted under the law, sampling arrests on the 
grounds of having a conviction from outside England and Wales may constitute a greater breach of 
privacy than retention of material already obtained. This legal issue has recently been resolved through 
the Policing and Crime Act 2017.[25]  
Finally, although the current PoFA system seeks to ensure proportionality between public and private 
interests, the Biometrics Commissioner notes that:  
“Absent indefinite retention of every arrestee’s biometrics, there will inevitably be times 
when crimes will go undetected or un-prevented because material obtained from 
individuals who have been arrested but not convicted is not retained for an indefinite 
period.”[28] 
3.3.2 Breach of privacy due to unlawful retention 
Whilst the bulk of data that are required to be deleted from the NDNAD have been deleted, challenges 
with the PNC, misapplication of the CPIA, oversight, and limited enforcement of rules for the 
CTDNAD have led to the potential unlawful retention of data from thousands of individuals.[12,25,28,37] 
These retained data are also subjected to automatic speculative searching the same as lawfully retained 
samples. Existing guidance to mitigate this privacy risk is the requirement that forces check the 
lawfulness of any NDNAD matches before acting upon them.[28] However, police forces have adopted 
a policy of using unlawful matches for intelligence purposes, an emerging issue which the Biometrics 
Commissioner indicates may potentially breach section 63T of PACE.[28] 
3.3.3 Contention surrounding future benefits of retention 
An emerging contention arising from the implementation of the PoFA regime is whether the retention 
of data from innocent individuals under section 63G(2) of PACE will contribute to the prevention or 
detection of crime in future.[12,25,28] Whilst some forces believe that retention for cases involving 
domestic violence for example, will be useful in detecting or preventing similar future crimes, the 
Biometrics Commissioner notes that “there will rarely be compelling reasons to believe that the 
retention of the material at issue may assist in the prevention or detection of crime”.[12] The reasons 
given are that such suspects will readily be identified by the victim or will be obvious suspects and the 
police will be able to sample them at that time.[12] 
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3.3.4 Need for expansion of qualifying offences 
Section 65A of PACE provides the list of qualifying offences that merit extended biometric data 
retention for innocent people. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Amendment: Qualifying 
Offences) Order 2013 expanded this list but excluded the possession of prohibited weapons and the 
importation of Class A drugs and their possession with intent to supply.[12,28] It is indicated that 
Parliament was to consider a legislative instrument covering those offences and other offences of a 
similar substance in mid-2016.[28] The Commissioner’s third report indicates this legal issue is still 
live.[25]       
3.3.5 Retention after a match but without arrest 
Following an NDNAD match, current police policy permits retention of DNA profiles without an arrest. 
There is no time limit for how long the sample can be retained whilst the match is being investigated. 
The Biometrics Commissioner has indicated that this policy breaches sections 63D(3), 63E, 63P and 
63T(2) of PACE which seems to proscribe the investigation of an offence without an arrest.[12,28] An 
amendment to the law and/or police policy has been suggested to resolve this issue but this is yet to be 
considered and implemented.[12,25,28]  
3.3.6 Complex NSD process 
A National Security Determination (NSD) is made by a Chief Constable in writing to extend retention 
of data of unconvicted individuals on national security grounds.[12] This NSD expires after two years 
and can be subjected to two years’ renewals afterwards. Individuals whose data are considered for an 
“NSD retention” are not informed about the existence of an NSD or the reasons for retention.[12] The 
statutory guidance on NSDs is provided by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Biometrics 
Commissioner and the Lord Advocate. The role of the Biometrics Commissioner is to review the NSDs 
and the use of retained material.[12,25,28] The NSD process runs on a dedicated IT system but the 
Biometrics Commissioner has no automatic access to the NSD applications’ underlying information, a 
situation described as time-consuming and labour intensive.[12,25,28]  
The 2014 report of the Biometrics Commissioner indicates that the current statutory guidance on NSDs 
could be more useful if illustrative examples that demonstrate when an NSD is appropriate are 
included.[12] Further, changes introduced by section 146 of the ASBCP should be included in the 
guidance.[12,28] Other specific issues that make the NSD process complicated include sample/data 
transfer delays; use of IT system that is incompatible with PoFA – a problem which has led to the 
calculation of wrong expiry dates for some data; NSDs made by officers of insufficient rank in a few 
cases; and reliability issues with statistical information on the number of individuals whose data are 
being held on national security issues.[12,28,37]  
3.3.7 Resource needs for compliance checks 
Following the implementation of PoFA, arrangements were made for UKAS to include PoFA 
compliance checks in its existing annual assessment scheme for Forensic Science Providers 
(FSPs).[12,25,28] This arrangement is yet to be formalized.[25] Whilst an assessment by UKAS was 
considered for police forces, this was perceived to be unnecessary and disproportionate among 
stakeholders.[28] Hence, the Biometrics Commissioner has decided to carry out this duty. About six 
PoFA compliance checks for police forces had been carried out as at the 2014/15 fiscal year.[28] The 
third report of the Commissioner indicates a transition to an internal PoFA compliance checks by police 
forces.[25] This internal system will be evaluated by the Commissioner to assure PoFA compliance by 
forces. It is emphasised that additional resources will be needed to carry out PoFA compliance checks 
effectively.[25,28] 
3.3.8 Limited statutory guidance for new genetic technologies 
The NEG reports emphasise the need for proper guidance and regulations for the introduction of Y-
STR profiling and databasing, and DNA phenotyping or massively parallel sequencing (also known as 
next generation sequencing (NGS)).[26,35,36] A comprehensive ethical impact assessment has been 
proposed on this issue.[26,35] Further, a wide consultation and debate has been recommended to evaluate 
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the ethical issues associated with these genetic technologies.[26,35,36] Some of the ethical issues include 
the possibility of searching for genetic links among males using Y-STR profiling and discriminatory 
genetic investigation against males.[35,36] The NGS technology can facilitate the prediction of the 
physical characteristics of individuals including eye and hair colour, age, ancestry and geographical 
area of origin, and health or disease risk.[26]  
4 Discussion 
The aim of this review was to identify the benefits, challenges, risks, and emerging issues associated 
with the implementation of the PoFA DNA retention regime. The key themes and findings identified 
from the analysed reports are discussed together under each topic below. 
4.1 Benefits of PoFA implementation 
Against the backdrop that forensic DNA retention has been subjected to political influence and 
restrictions by country specific laws, there is need to establish standards to safeguard the privacy of 
individuals and the safety of the public. This is particularly important with the increasing need for data 
exchange among different organisations, the increase in cross-border police investigations and the 
demand for international collaboration in law enforcement.[39–41] The new retention regime introduced 
by PoFA takes consideration of the principles of proportionality and necessity as emphasised in the 
Marper decision.[16] Though some practical benefits have been realised, there are still gaps that need 
urgent attention.  
In 2014, Wallace et al[42] carried out a global review of DNA database legislation, focussing on human 
right standards for the effective operation of forensic DNA databases. The review concluded that there 
is a growing global consensus to exclude non-convicted individual’s DNA records from databases. A 
previous survey by the Metropolitan Police Authority Civil Liberties Panel also showed that eight out 
of ten Londoners support the deletion of DNA data of non-convicted individuals.[43] This model is 
perceived to be proportionate or balanced.[44] The PoFA regime appears to be only partially consistent 
with these views. The DNA records of most non-convicted individuals are excluded from retention. 
Though data of individuals arrested/charged with serious offences can be retained, “administrative 
checkpoints” including the independent OBC have been instituted to ensure that their human rights are 
adequately protected. This policy could enhance public confidence in the operation of the NDNAD.[44] 
The new regime could also improve the level of transparency in DNA retention by keeping innocent 
individuals fully informed when the police request extended retention.  
While the PoFA regime would appear to offer a good level of genetic privacy protection for the 
innocent, the system is in sharp contrast with the health service model of informed consent, which is 
applied in medical research and the operation of medical biobanks.[45] The extended retention of forensic 
DNA profiles of individuals arrested/charged with a serious offence takes no regard of the informed 
consent of the individual, their right to withdraw consent and deletion of data. It appears that the State 
has more power over these arrestee/charged non-convicted individuals, and indirectly this category of 
individuals seems to be less “innocent” than other non-convicted individuals or volunteers. This raises 
the question of the proportionality of the PoFA regime.[15,22]  
Another concern with the genetic privacy of individuals is that the new retention policy focuses upon 
the data of the innocent. Although the DNA profiles of some first time convicted minors are subjected 
to fixed retention, the bulk of convicted individuals are subjected to indefinite retention. There is no 
consideration of the seriousness of offence and severity of sentence as emphasised by the ECtHR in W 
v The Netherlands[46] and characteristic of the Dutch system and many others internationally.[47] The 
PoFA model may be problematic because the stored DNA profile can be used to track biological 
relatives through familial searching. This means that the family of the individual may be subjected to 
indefinite bio-surveillance though innocent. Some issues raised are whether individuals have the right 
to surrender their genetic information to the government along with that of their innocent biological 
family without their knowledge or informed consent.[23] Further, what assurances are required to ensure 
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that the privacy of biological relatives is adequately protected. These are vital considerations in 
establishing a proportionate regime. 
The review indicates an improvement in the match output of the NDNAD following PoFA 
implementation (current match rate of 63.3%). This suggests that, potentially, the database may be 
representative of the active criminal population and, if adequately utilised, could improve crime 
detection and case resolution. Nevertheless, given that DNA hits do not always lead to case resolution 
due to changes in legislation, investigative and prosecutorial problems, and witness or suspect issues,[48] 
the match rate does not demonstrate the efficacy of the database. Database match/hit outcomes such as 
the resolution of cold crimes, crime deterrence and reduction of crime, the efficiency of investigations 
(e.g. through DNA intelligence hits) and prosecution, and conviction rates have been recommended in 
previous studies as adequate measures of database efficacy.[48,49] In April 2014, a new Recorded Crimes 
Outcomes Framework was introduced which allows the police in England and Wales to count database 
hit outcomes. The specific outcome measures include the number of charges/summons, cautions, 
deceased offenders, PNDs issued, cannabis warnings and community resolutions. Although this 
framework is a step towards a more detailed understanding of database effectiveness, it is limited in 
scope and the efficacy metrics suggested in previous studies[48,49] should be considered.  
This review shows that the new retention system has accrued some important secondary benefits 
including decreased cost of DNA sample storage, improvement of retention compliance checks, and 
opportunity for case review. In 2006, McCartney[50] reviewed the DNA Expansion Programme and 
highlighted the high financial cost and resourcing required for the operation of the database, which may 
be detrimental to resourcing other demands upon police. The requirement to destroy millions of DNA 
samples under the new regime will therefore potentially create an opportunity for reinvestment in other 
areas of policing. The introduction of DNA sample retention compliance checks is an important 
approach to scrutinising police and FSP retention practices. This will help identify gaps between 
law/policy and practice to enhance the continuous development of effective systems. The periodic 
assessment will also assure the public how retained DNA material is being used, significantly improving 
transparency, accountability, public confidence and the assurance of genetic privacy protection. The 
value of compliance checks requires that the OBC is adequately resourced to cover all forces. 
While there is provision for criminal case reviews in the UK, this is mainly focused on cases where a 
miscarriage of justice is suspected and a first appeal has failed.[51] The selection of cases for cold case 
investigative reviews is also highly dependent on the seriousness of the offence, availability of 
resources, opportunities to apply new technology and prospects of case progression.[52] These factors 
inform the prioritisation of cases hence some cases may be overlooked or re-investigation of the cold 
case may be delayed. The introduction of Biometric Retention Units offers an opportunity for the police 
to review all cases to identify those that require an extension of biometric data. This means that gaps, 
shortcomings and opportunities in some cases may be identified early for re-investigation. For example, 
the BRU of the MPS identified a case where an NFA-ed person should have been prosecuted and 
convicted based on the available evidence.  
4.2 Challenges of the PoFA implementation 
The PoFA retention regime is not problem-free. Firstly, there are critical challenges with the 
configuration of the Police National Computer that drives the retention and deletion of DNA profiles 
on the NDNAD. The incompatibility of the PNC undermines the goal of achieving a proportionate DNA 
data retention system. The implication of the current “compromise” system is that the police can 
potentially manipulate the system to unlawfully retain or delete data of arrestees.[53] There is a need for 
thorough audit systems for the technology and PNC processes to identify the scale of potential breaches 
and resolve technical problems.  
Secondly, the success of the current retention system is highly dependent on the cooperation of the 
police. Poor police engagement puts the public at risk since some crimes (that failed to be prevented) 
may go undetected. Alternatively, the genetic privacy of some individuals may be breached. In 2008, 
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Fraser[54] reviewed the Scottish retention system, focussing on the temporal retention of DNA data of 
unconvicted individuals. The review emphasised that an approach to biometric retention that 
coordinates policies and practices of all relevant stakeholders is crucial to achieving the aims of the law. 
The current discretionary PoFA system in England and Wales seem to have been developed without 
taking account of the views of the police or adequate consideration of police investigative or 
intelligence-gathering practices and principles. This review indicates some police forces are dissatisfied 
with the transfer of biometric data retention risks from legislators to the police. Also, the new regime 
places a demand upon police budgets and resources, other policing areas may thus suffer if PoFA is 
implemented to the letter. Another reason for poor police engagement is potential PoFA awareness or 
guidance gaps. A thorough appraisal and survey of police perceptions about the current PoFA retention 
regime are recommended to understand the underlying issues in order to resolve this challenge. 
This review indicates a potential challenge with database contamination. Crime scenes can be 
contaminated by DNA of police officers or crime scene examiners.[55,56] Evidence items may also be 
contaminated by laboratory analyst’s due to improper handling or poor anti-contamination 
techniques.[55,56] Furthermore, forensic DNA consumables such as cotton swabs may be contaminated 
by manufacturers as revealed in the famous “Phantom of Heilbronn” case.[57,58] These factors, together 
with record handling errors, interpretation and transcription of data errors, may contribute to database 
contamination.[24] One effective strategy to overcome database contamination is the establishment of 
elimination databases, which can be crosschecked to eliminate unwanted DNA data.[58–61] Another 
strategy is routine integrity checks of loaded DNA data.[34] The presence of unwanted profiles on the 
database can mislead the police or delay the resolution of cases.[55] Another crucial consequence is that 
where a subject profile is matched with wrong arrestee/sampling information, data may be unlawfully 
retained or deleted under the current PoFA system. Moreover, database contamination can lead to the 
wrong estimation of database effectiveness output or outcome metrics. The challenge of database 
contamination is acknowledged in the reports and plans are underway to eradicate contamination and 
mitigate the risks associated with this issue. 
Most of the reports indicate that the governance of the CTDNAD is inadequate. This may be a 
contributing factor in the emerging issues associated with the complex NSD process. Although the 
Strategy Board has an oversight function of the CTDNAD, this is mainly focused on the technical, 
scientific and operational aspects.[35] To maintain transparency, accountability and public confidence in 
the retention and use of individuals’ data, the current governance arrangements for the NDNAD should 
be applied to the CTDNAD. Information about governance, guidance policies, statistics of profiles held 
on the database per retention category, the primary (and any secondary) use of individual’s data and 
match rate should be in the public domain. This is crucial because unlike the NDNAD, unconvicted 
individuals are not informed about the grounds for extended retention of their data through the NSD 
process.  
A key characteristic of the current PoFA system is discretionary retention. This policy introduces a level 
of subjectivity in deciding when retention of some unconvicted individuals is necessary. There could 
be biases in the number of cases selected or approved for extended retention. This is problematic 
because specific guidance and legal definitions are lacking. Although some guidance has been 
developed by the Biometrics Commissioner and the Strategy Board, this has not been subjected to 
robust public or Parliamentary debate. Another problem is that the discretionary retention policy 
appears bureaucratic and expensive to implement – potentially delaying police work. As suggested by 
the Biometrics Commissioner, it may be worth abolishing the discretionary retention policy and 
introducing a bright-line rule, which could be more cost-efficient. Another important issue with 
discretionary retention is the non-consensual resampling of individuals after data deletion (as amended 
by s144 of ASBCPA). The initial policy of resampling by consent may be more ethical than the current 
rule. The new rule may have adverse psychological impacts or ethical implications for unconvicted 
individuals. For example, after an individual has been acquitted of an offence (or an investigation/ 
prosecution halted), the person should note that compulsory resampling is still open – granting more 
power to the State over its citizens’ genetic property. There is a need for public debate and consultation 
with relevant agencies to consider the ethical impact of this policy.  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
14 
 
The current PoFA regime provides for the destruction of the DNA sample after profiling because of its 
sensitivity. Under some circumstances, however, the DNA sample of a known individual may be 
required for prosecution disclosure purposes, which is provided for by the current law (s146 of 
ASBCPA). The CPIA exception permits the sample to be stored beyond the statutory 6 months’ period 
but it must be destroyed after its purpose has been fulfilled. Sensitive private information such as health 
and disease risk can be predicted using DNA sequencing technologies.[62,63] This type of analysis 
requires the original DNA sample and its retention is perceived to be disproportionate and unnecessary 
in the prevention and detection of crime.[44,64]  To maintain public confidence in the temporal retention 
and proper use of DNA samples, there is a need for transparent and accountable oversight. An effective 
audit system must be established to prevent the misapplication of the CPIA rule by police forces. Access 
to retained DNA samples should be restricted to vetted officers and sufficient information about 
governance, the number of samples held and use should be in the public domain.  
The final challenge with PoFA implementation is volunteer sampling and samples. Volunteer DNA 
data plays a crucial role in investigative work. It can be used to detect contamination or eliminate people 
who are unlikely to be suspected in a case such as victims, relatives or friends.  The sensitivity of the 
DNA sample calls for restrictive access and adequate protections against misuse. Although new policy 
guidance consistent with PoFA is being developed, there is a need for clear statutory regulations 
informed by public debate and consultation with stakeholders. This is important because volunteer data 
can be subjected to the same treatment as arrestees – including speculative and familial searching. 
4.3 Risks and emerging issues 
Though there is limited information to justify retention of DNA material of unconvicted individuals, it 
is known that some individuals within this category may be actual offenders or may commit a crime in 
the future.[65] This is also true however, for the entire population who are presumed innocent. 
Preliminary studies by Pease[66] and Tseloni and Pease[67] show subsequent re-arrest and conviction 
among unconvicted individuals. The re-arrest rate is estimated to be at the same rate as that of 
individuals cautioned or given non-custodial sentences – approximately 52% within 6 years.[18] While 
the reliability of this statistic has been questioned,[15] both preliminary studies suggest that discretionary 
retention of DNA data from unconvicted individuals based on the seriousness of offence or age may 
diminish crime detection efforts. These conclusions are consistent with the assertion of the Biometrics 
Commissioner that some crimes may go undetected or fail to be prevented because all arrestee data are 
not subjected to indefinite retention. These views suggest that the PoFA retention regime may be 
slightly skewed towards individual privacy rights and there is a need for careful consideration of the 
competing public interests, especially because extended retention is mainly considered for serious 
offences. Regarding the ethical issues associated with the re-sampling arrest of individuals with 
convictions from outside England and Wales, the new Policing and Crime Act 2017[68] permits 
indefinite retention of material taken from an unrelated arrest. The scope of sampling has also been 
expanded to include all offences equivalent to a recordable offence under English and Welsh law. These 
changes are at par with individuals convicted of recordable crimes in England and Wales. It may be 
safe to assume that the public security risks associated with non-retention of the biometric material of 
this category of individuals will be mitigated by including their DNA records on the NDNAD.  
Another important emerging issue is the contention surrounding the future benefits of retention, 
particularly for domestic violence offences. There is extant research that establishes the heterogeneity 
of offences committed by individual offenders.[67,69,70] Though retention may not be beneficial to a 
domestic offence investigation involving the same victim, retention may be valuable to other offences 
such as stranger rape. Indirectly, DNA retention may have a “secondary” deterrence effect on the NFA-
ed arrestee of a domestic offence.  
Clearly, the restrictions of PoFA may limit the intelligence gathering efforts of the police. There should 
be adequate guidance and statutory rules on the use of unlawful matches to avoid the public security 
concerns and legal challenges encountered previously under the CJPOA regime (See R v B, Attorney 
General’s Reference No 3 of 1999 [2000] UKHL 71 (UKHL (2000)) and R v Weir [2000] EWCA Crim 
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43). The question remains, if an unlawful match is obtained and the DNA link is the only evidence that 
can progress a case, should it be acted upon? What should be the procedure under such circumstances? 
As pointed out by the Biometrics Commissioner, current police practice may be contrary to the law. 
However, there may be circumstances whereby an unlawful match may be the only investigative lead 
in an unsolved crime. These factors should be carefully considered in striking the right balance between 
public and private interests.  
In the Government’s response to the 2015 annual report of the Biometrics Commissioner, it was 
indicated that Parliament would consider a legislative instrument expanding the list of qualifying 
offences by the end of 2016.[71] It is not clear what other offences may be considered apart from those 
suggested by the Commissioner. It appears that the opportunity to expand the list may widen the 
inclusion criteria and facilitate database expansion. It is highly recommended that the core principles 
and relevant factors applied by the Commissioner including the relevance of DNA and the potential 
crime reduction or detection value of retention should be considered. Also in the Government’s 
response, it was stated that new guidance would be issued to resolve the issue of retaining DNA data 
after a match without arrest.  
Finally, the review identified limited statutory regulation for “new” genetic technologies that are not 
specifically covered by PoFA. It appears that Y-STR profiling and databasing are being applied, though 
under strict regulation, without a dedicated legislation or comprehensive public consultation and debate. 
In a review of the legislative framework governing the NDNAD and the Netherlands DNA database, 
Toom[72] concluded that the “Dutch model” of dedicated legislation to genetic technology 
implementation offers civil rights advantages over the English and Welsh model of technology 
implementation to “legislative fixes”. This is consistent with recent recommendations by the Forensic 
Genetics Policy Initiative.[44] The inclusion of privacy rules in legislation and from the onset of 
establishing genetic databases is perceived to be easier than its introduction after establishing the 
database.[44] To avoid the historical legal challenges associated with the NDNAD, the Dutch model 
should be considered for new genetic technologies. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper reviewed a total of ten reports of the two independent statutory authorities (NDNAD Strategy 
Board and the Office of the Biometrics Commissioner) and an independent non-statutory advisory 
public body (NDNAD Ethics Group) specifically tasked with oversight of the UK National DNA 
Database. The purpose of the review was to identify the benefits, challenges, risks and emerging issues 
associated with the implementation of the new DNA retention regime introduced by the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. The review indicates that the system may have improved the match output of the 
database, with a current match rate of 63.3%. Compared to previous regimes, it appears the composition 
of the database under the PoFA regime may be more representative of the active criminal population 
and the regime may improve the crime-solving capacity of the database. Additionally, the new system 
has strengthened the genetic privacy protection of UK citizens, particularly the genetic privacy of the 
innocent. This benefit may improve public confidence in the operation of the database. The 
implementation challenges identified ranges from the Police National Computer configuration, legal 
and procedural issues to sufficient understanding of the requirements of PoFA by police forces.  The 
review shows that some “retainable” profiles have been deleted and this may potentially diminish crime 
detection or reduction and raise public security concerns. Also, some DNA data have been unlawfully 
retained and the current police practice permits the use of unlawful matches for intelligence purposes. 
This policy may lead to privacy issues and challenges in court. Although limited in scope, this review 
advances the literature on the global evolution of forensic DNA database policy. The review shows that 
the current law in UK could potentially improve the effectiveness of forensic DNA databases whilst 
complying with human rights law. The challenges identified, however, suggest that there may be a 
significant gap between the law and implementation. Overall, the review emphasises the need for 
comparative empirical research to adequately demonstrate the efficacy of forensic DNA databases. 
Objective research is vital because this review focused on reports of government bodies and there is a 
possibility of framing or reporting bias. The crucial areas to consider include the perception of 
stakeholders directly involved in the operation and use of the database, and the impact of different 
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retention criteria and retention lengths on the performance of the database. This may help establish 
adequate public security and human rights standards for the NDNAD and potentially forensic biometric 
databases worldwide.  
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Table 1 – Summary of the different legislative regimes enacted/proposed to govern DNA profile 
retention on the England and Wales NDNAD 
Retention category Criminal 
Justice and 
Public Order 
Act 1994 
(Restrictive 
regime) 
Criminal Justice 
and Police Act 
2001 & Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 
(Expansive 
regime) 
Crime and 
Security Act 
2010 
(Repealed) 
Protection of 
Freedoms Act 
2012 
(semi-restrictive 
regime) 
CONVICTION 
Adults All crimes 
Indefinite Indefinite 
Indefinite Indefinite 
Under 
18 
years 
Serious 
offence 
Indefinite Indefinite 
Minor 
Offence 
First conviction:  
5 years 
Second 
conviction: 
indefinite 
First conviction:  
5 years + length 
of sentence 
Second 
conviction or 
custodial 
sentence > 5 
years: 
 indefinite 
NON-CONVICTIONS 
All offences 
Automatic 
deletion after 
conclusion of 
investigation or 
proceedings α Indefinite 
 
 
 
 
Adults: 6 years 
Under 18 years:  
3 years 
Automatic 
deletion after 
conclusion of 
investigation or 
proceedings 
Charged with a 
Qualifying Offence 
3 years (2-year 
renewal with 
consent of 
District Judge) 
Arrested for a 
qualifying offence 
3 years may be 
granted by 
Biometrics 
Commissioner 
(2-year renewal 
with consent of 
District Judge) 
Issued with a Penalty 
Notice for Disorder 
(PND) 
2 years 
Terrorist suspects Indefinite β  6 years 
(+possible 
multiple 2 years 
with National 
Security 
Determination 
(NSD) by Chief 
Constable) 
Retention under 
relevant 
legislation γ (+ 
possible 
multiple 2 years 
with NSD by 
Chief 
Constable) 
(NB: αSamples/profiles of the innocent could be retained if the individual is part of a group of suspects of whom 
at least one was convicted in the relevant case.  The retained material, however, could not be used as evidence 
against the individual or for investigation purposes. βNo obligation to destroy data under Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 1989. γ Including Terrorism Act 2000, Counter-terrorism Act 2008, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Act 2011) 
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Table 2 – Selected annual or official reports included in review 
Body Report Title Period Date Published 
National DNA 
Database 
Strategy Board 
National DNA Database: annual 
report 2013-14[33] 
2013-2014 16/12/2014 
National DNA Database: Annual 
Report 2014/15[34] 
2014-2015 14/12/2015 
National DNA Database: Annual 
report 2015/16[24] 
2015-2016 23/02/2017 
National DNA 
Database Ethics 
Group 
Annual report of The Ethics 
Group: National DNA Database 
2014[35] 
2014 24/03/2015 
Annual report of The Ethics 
Group: National DNA Database 
2015[26] 
2015 16/11/2016 
Annual report of the Ethics 
Group: National DNA Database 
2016[36] 
2016 30/10/2017 
Office of the 
Biometric 
Commissioner 
Annual report 2014: 
Commissioner for the Retention 
and Use of Biometric Material[12] 
2013-2014 16/12/2014 
Annual Report 2015: 
Commissioner for the Retention 
and Use of Biometric Material[28] 
2014-2015 11/03/2016 
Further Report by The 
Biometrics Commissioner on 
Issues Raised in His 2015 
Annual Report[37] 
2014-2015 26/05/2016 
Annual Report 2016: 
Commissioner for the Retention 
and Use of Biometric Material[25] 
2015-2016 13/09/2017 
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Table 3 – Main themes identified from the reviewed reports 
Category Themes Number of 
reports 
Benefits of PoFA Improved, proportionate balance between public and 
private interests 
9 
Increased match rate 7 
Decreased sample storage cost 1 
Strengthened retention compliance checks 3 
Opportunity for case review 3 
Challenges of PoFA 
implementation 
Police National Computer (PNC) limitations 3 
Non-engagement of police forces with PoFA 3 
Limited data on case resolution rate 9 
Database contamination and error rates 7 
Inadequate enforcement of PoFA rules for Counter-
terrorism DNA Database (CTDNAD) 
6 
Limited statutory guidance on discretionary retention 5 
Misapplication of Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) exception 
3 
Inadequate rules for volunteer sampling and samples 6 
Risks/emerging 
issues associated 
with PoFA 
implementation 
Public security risk due to non-retention of data 3 
Breach of privacy due to unlawful retention 4 
Contention surrounding future benefits of retention 3 
Need for expansion of qualifying offences 3 
Retention after a match but without arrest 3 
Complex National Security Determination (NSD) 
process 
4 
Resource needs for compliance checks 3 
Limited statutory guidance for new genetic technologies 3 
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